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Friday, April 2Sth, 1876. 
~ ~ A J O R - G E K E R A L  SIR GhR,NET WOLSELEY, K.C.B., G.C.lI.G., 
Brc., &c., i n  the Chair. 
THE TAC’I’ICAL POWER OF XODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 
By Licut.-Col. C. B. BRACEEXDUET, R.A., A.A.G., S.O.G.I. 
ACCORDIKG to a fashionable theory of philosoplicrs, tlie lifc of D nation 
is an exact copy of thaL of an individual, and passes throngli the 
various stages of candid but credulous cllildhood, poetical and studious 
youth, vigorous manhood and grasping but feeblc agc. We mere 
told by “the greatest, wiscst, meanest of mankind,” that “ in  tho 
‘L youth of a state, arms do flourish; in  tlie middle ago of a state, 
” learning; and thenboth of tlicm togetlicr fora time; in the declining 
C C  agc of a state, meclianiml arts and mcrcliandizc.” According to 
this saying we English, nay, we Europeans, ouglit to bc in a. condition 
of dccrepitudc. But, for  m y  pwt I can see no signs of it a t  present. 
Thc roads that run from town to  town and village to villago farour 
thc march of armies ; the railways that rcnllcr our tradc easy and thc 
cxistcncc of such cities as London possible, serrc to  collect and fecd 
monstrous bodies of troops ; the telegraphs carry the ordcrs of com- 
inandcrs as well as the mcssngcs of traders; if the sea is corered d h  
steam merchant .ships, it bears up also Iicarily armed ironclads; and, 
wliilc tlic present ,perfection of mechanical rtrt producce a thousand 
luxuries liitlierto undreamt of, it has also rcndercd possible tlie dc- 
rclopment of artillcry. 
I do not propose to inflict on you c-icn n sketch of the history of 
field artillery, but it. is ncccssary for the understanding of our snbjcct 
that we should bear in mind how niodcrn anything like n nianaurring 
tield bntter-v is. As late as l t 0 0 ,  the artillcry train dispntclied with the 
cspedition to the Law Countries liad to  be improrised for the occasion. 
Thc guns, attaclicd in pairs to battalions, iwrc drawn by Iica~y horses 
driven by Dutcli waggoners who walked besido tlicir teams mitli long 
wliips. Though Napoleon the First iniprox-cd liis artillcry SO that hc 
and his Generals won great battles by its daring cmployment in  
Iuasses, xrc English entered ou the Pcninsular war witli our field 
artillcry in a wry poor condition. Shortly nftcr tlic commencement 
o f  tho Peninsular war, Wellington wrote : “ I shall be obliged to 
“ leave Spenser’s guns beliincl for  want of means of moring thcm, 
” and I should h r c  been obliged to l carc  my own if i t  werc not for 
“ thc horses of tlie Irish Commissariat.” A littlc later, before tho 
ItattIc of Vimiera (1808) he said: “Our artillerj Iiorscs itre not what 
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T ~ I E  TACTICAL I’OIVEE OF UODEIIS F I E L U  AI:TILLE1:Y. 311 
q.e onglit to lime; thcy l i a ~  great merit in their way as cnrt-horses 
‘6 of dragoons and Irish cart-horses, bonght for $12 each! but 
6; not fit for an army that, to be succcssfnl and carry things with a 
high ilaud, ought to bc able to more.” ‘J!h carriages were i n  no 
better condition. Kapicr says that the pursuit of tlic enemy aft,,,r 
Irimicra. liad to be stopped becausc “ tlic artillcry carriages wCrC so 
L; 
Ercn EO late tlic battle of the Alma the gnus sent over tl1e riyci- 
8 critical period liad to be worked partly by officers because tile 
In the present day cren field battcrics e m  more for short distancyj 
a gdlop, carrying the gunners rcquisitc €or tlic service of the 
xhilc the fire O f  thc guns has iUCrCaSCd to an extent x-hich 
then Iinvc bccn considered impossible. 
Thcrcforc, in trying to estimate the modern place of field artillcry, 
we need not stutlr old xx-ars, but may confine oursclrcs to examples 
taken €ram the last war bctxccn France and Gcrnmy. The battles 
round Netz arc espccially interesting both bccause the Germans there 
met the flower of the French Army, and bccause a German artillery 
officer, Captain Hoffbancr, 113s gi-icn US most careful and instruc- 
tivc account of the work of his o-irn arm in those cngagcments. The 
instances \vc arc about to csaminc are not all set bcforo yon as 
csamplcs to be followed; some of them only show dint is possible, not 
what is to bc rccommcndcd. 
Xoriz~y.-Few battle-fields could be more nnfavourablc than that of 
U o r q  for tlic action of artillery. It was iutcrscctcd by rarincs, water- 
courses, cncloscd rillagcs, Tineyards, ~ ~ n l I s ,  plantations, and hedges ; 
in fact it is one of tliose battle-fields xhcrc artillcry can, ns a rule, 
move only on the roads. The action commenced by a most plucky 
attack mxlc by the advance guard of the 7th corps, the objcct of the 
corps Commander being to grip the enemy and force him to suspend 
liis retreat from tlie right bank of the IIosellc, and so givc morc time 
for the turning moremetit of Prince Frcderiek Charles. 
The Frcncli were very superior in numbers a t  first, and remained 
morc numerous to the- cnd of the day cwn d e n  a11 the arailable 
Prussinn troops had come up. 3Ioreover, they i r r r c  frcsli troops and 
fought with the I~mow1edge that  they could, at tlic worst, take shcltcr 
under the guns of IIctz and lier forts, evcn i f  forced to give up tlicir 
strong defeusirc position. 
Yet, in spite of all disadvantages, x e  find tho artillery pushed ~ c l l  
forward at first, and reinforced as soon as possible by the batteries of 
thc I. Corps sent on a t  n rapid trot f a r  iiz, adcaiice of their iifantry. 
We find the batteries falling naturally into groups or masses whenever 
it was possible, and holdiug their own against both infantry and 
nrtillcq- fire. We find one of the masses limbcring up under f i ~ e  
and nio-&g to thc right flank, which was tlircatcned by the extension 
of the French left. An episode is well xrortli rcnicmb2ring. The right 
wing of Ton der Goltz’s bpigadc had dashed into a small pinc  WOO^, but 
found itself attacked and surrounded by Iiea-iy forccs of tho French. 
Hoffbauer’s battery morcd at  once to a position about 800 yards from 
as to be scarcely fit for scrricc.” 
toiling on foot  could not kecp pacc with them. 
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tile enemy, and opened fire to cxtricntc the infantry. 
tllus stated in his o m  words :- 
TIIE TACTICAL POWEI: OF JIODE1:X FIELD ATLTILLEIW. 
The result is 
‘( The enemy’s columns suddenly disappeared, and their place n-as 
taken by long lines of skirmishers, one behind another; mitrailleurs 
‘6 and guns also opened fire. For a fern minutes the battery mas 
( 6  csposed to a heary fire from skirmishers in the vineyards of La 
d L  Planchctte, adjoining the defile of Jlontoy, but opening fir0 with 
(‘ case at 400 ~ J ~ C C S ,  it cleared the ground.” 
Three Officers mere 
wounded, and all the Officer’s horses but one killed or mounded ; but 
the desired efYcet was prodneed and the battery continued in action 
throughout the day. Its losses in this action in killed and wounded 
were 20 Officers and men, and 28 horses. The total combatant force 
of n Prussian battery is, or was then, GG Officers and men, and48 
horses. 
The total artillery losses in the battle werc 138 Officers and men, 
and 158 horses. The damages to material irere only one gun-carriage, 
one limber, and three wheels broken, though the ground mas often 
dangerous to travel over. 
You mill find the scanty losses of material compared vi th  men and 
horses a w r y  marked feature of artillery combats, quite sufficiently 
marked to base tactical reasoning upon as I shall do hereafter. 
X u r s  la Tour, T’io7iciZZe.-Thc battle of Jlars la Tour or Vion-dIe 
on the lGth August was, like that of Borny, undertaken to check 
the supposed retreat of Bazaine’s army from BIetz to Verdun. The 
Germans were not, aware that the French had four Corps close a t  hand, 
though we cannot be sure that such knowledge, if obtained, would hare 
materially altered their tactics. Their faith in  attack is profound, and 
the French army had to be held fast a t  all hazards to prevent its junc- 
tion with JIacJIahon’s retreating columns, and the troops assembled a t  
Chalons. 
The battle commenced by the arrival of the advanced guard of the 
5th cavalry division near Tronville. I ts  battery immediatelj- opened 
fire on hostile camlry near Vionrille. Some of the French cavalry 
werc watering their horses, and the streets of the town were full of 
baggage. The result was apanie. d French battery presently replied. 
The thrcc Prussian batteries with the main body rushed on to range 
themselves beside their comrades of the adranecd guard, and drove 
back the enemy. lfeanmhilc, as usual, the artillery of the nearest 
Infantry difision \\-as ordered forward by the Corps Commander, and 
the battery of its advanced guard soon occupied the position near 
T r o n d e ,  taking the place of part of the Horse Artillery which  as 
pushed on to the hill at  Pionvillc. After a few rounds they again 
prcssed on close to Vionvillc; but the French now adranccd with 
swarms of skirmishers, reoccupied Vionville, and pushed though tho 
village against the guns. The two batteries closest to the villago 
having no friendly infantry near them, werc ordered to draw back 
under eowr of the hill ; but Iliillcr’s battery-one of those .rrliicli had 
come forward from the infantry division, and w’as now not far off- 
moved LIP close to the village and came into action under a heavy fire, 
The losses of the battery were considerable. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
34
.11
7.1
0.2
00
] a
t 0
5:3
0 1
5 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
~ 1 1 ~  T,ICTICAL POWEI: 01’ MODERN FIELD ACTlLLERY. 313 
scveral horses being killed or  wounded. “ Swarms of skirmishers again 
l I  rnslled out from \Tionrilh and the momcnt became critical. The 
L‘ battery- had rceourse to case, and succeeded in driving the enemj- back 
1c into the village ; but 3s the C~OSC and biting musketry fire contilluecl 
Li to makc many casualties, it  retired some 300 or  400 paces and took 
I C  up n. fresh position.” SO here 11-0 l1aT-C an example of batteries 
unsupported by infautrF, yet holding b d i  large forces of tile 
c n c ~ y ’ s  infantry. Homvcr, the French continued to gather in s\\-arms, 
and the artillery had to fight a delaying action, retreating here, ad-ianc- 
ing tbere, till tlie Prussinn infantry cauie up. 
After this, nnd throughout the battle, the guns continually checked 
the admncc of French bodies of troops, while on tho other lland i t  is 
that they often suffered greatly from the fire of infantry 
It is sometimes said that the fire of artillery has little physical, but 
only moral effect. Let mc quote n. paragraph from Hoffbancr’s 
account, latcr on in this battle :-“T~vo dense columns of infantry, 
4‘ issuing suddenly from buildings to tho north-east and south-cast 
(of Plavigny), were shelled by the wholo of the batteries a t  a range 
‘6 of 1,500 or 1,600 paces, and retreated to Rczonville, lea-i-ing tile 
c: ground literally covered with corpses, Tvllile strong French columns, 
6‘ wliicli ad-ianccd from the hill to re-occupy the Tillage, sharcd the 
6‘ same fate.” Kcst day the neighbourhood of Flavigny ~ v a s  strewn 
sit11 bodics of men, and of a large herd of cattle, which had fled from 
the farms, torn and mangled by shells. 
I t  is not my business to dcscribc this‘ or an? battle, only to give IOU 
a fen- suggestire incidents. We find Captain Xullcr withdraa-ing his 
battery some 200 paces, so as to bring it info  line with the s7;irnzishcr~ 
tf iz faatry ,  which had already retircd. Again and again 7x0 find 
artillery puslied forward within short distance of the enemy to dis- 
engage cshaustcd or ovcrivhelmed infantry. Wc find battery coming 
successfully out of a struggle in xhieh it lost so much from the fire 
of mitraillcurs that “ tmo guns were rendered temporarily useless by 
“ want of gunners, :Ind three guns lost so many horses that thej- 
(‘ could not be moved.” When Wedell’s Infantry Brigade ad-ianccd 
from BIars Lz Tour, and lost G5 officers and 2,600 men out of 85 
officers and 4,500 men-more than half its strength, being utterly 
orcrwhelmed by numbers-the three supporting battcrics had to risk 
everything to extricate the infantry. Two of them held their ground 
till the enemy’s infantry were actually close to the muzzles of tho 
guns. They were sal-ed in their turn by gallant charges of ca-ialry. 
Bu t  they mere samd ! 
During the latter portion of the battlo, nineteen batteries (114 guns) 
held the line betmeen the Bois dc Viondlc and the high road beyond 
Fla-rigny, supported attacks, and always checked pursuit, because so 
long a line can play a t  once on the front and flanks of the advancing 
cncm-j-. Remembering horn overmatched the Germans w r e  in 
numbers, it is not surprising to find that the casualties were SO 
numerous that “drivers, and ercn olficers, had to work the guns, some 
of which had tcmporarily to cease firing for want of gnniicrs.” 
at 1,200 to 1,600 paces. 
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316 T ~ I E  l’-\CTICAL POWER OF JIODERZS FIELD IXTILLECY. 
Most of the teams rrere reduced to trvo horses. Yet they were not 
driven back, a11d in tho evening some of these batteries were actually 
sent forward to attack. It mas so dusk that a t  100 paces enemies 
could not be distingnishcd from friends. Xore than oncc they 
blondered into thc prescncc of thc enemy, and s a d  themselves by 
shell or caw. 
At  the close of the battle thc artillerj-men werc for the most part 
cshaustcd, many of tlic men bcing almost blind and deaf. Xost of 
tho guns wcru very foul, and several instances of shells jamming in 
the bore had occurred in consequence. 
Thc losses in killed and n-oundcd werc 42 Officers, G85 men, 
1009 horscs,’ an average of one Oficer, 18 men, and 38 horses per 
battery-that is to say, morc than one-fourth of the men and more 
than tlircc-fourths of thc horses. One battery lost 4 Officers, 42 men, 
and 50 horses, or about three-qnnrters of its Officcrs and men, and 
more than its complement of horses. 
The losses in material merc quite insignificant-ono gun carriage, 
5 limbers, 8 wheels, a pole, and an aslctrec seat damnqed. They had 
fired about 20,000 rounds, of which 19 were casc. Want of ammuni- 
tion was often cxpcrienccd. 
The ranges were various, from more than 4,000 paces to 800 
frequently, and more tlian oncc 300 or 408 paces. The enemy often 
adranced undcr fire to within 800 or 900 paccs, say, 700 p r d s ,  but 
Rere almost alwajs checked at  about that range. And the instaucos 
of short ranges generally occurred at  decisive moments, when no 
attention could bo paid to co-rer. 
Grmelotte. 
The battle was commenced by the LY Corps sending on through 
Vern6ville the artillery of the 18th Dil-ision and the Corps Artillery, 
escorted by t x o  squadrons of the 6th Dragoons, to the hill beyond the 
d l e y  N.E. of VernS~lle,  mitliin effectiro range of the enemy, who 
were near Amanvillcrs. The battery of the advanced p a r d  pushed on 
and opened fire from ncnr the road N. of Verni?villc, but shortly after 
thc Divisional Artillery camc.up at a trot (not Horse Artillery, mind,) 
and, crossing a rather difficult ditch at  a @lop, camc into action 1,000 
paces further forward, and fiecl a t  hostile batteries to the mest and 
south of Jlontigny la, Grange. Prcsently the Corps Artillery camc up 
a t  D trot, and ranged itself on the left of tho Divisioiinl Srtillery, 
along the hi11 bctv;cen VernSrille and Amanrillcrs. -~TLC enemy 
replied from batteries under corer, mitrailleurs, and infantry fire, a t  
1,000 paces, pushing forKard skirmishers even closer. The fire T T ~ S  
so hot that thc escorting trro squadrons of dragoons were sent back to 
Vern6villc. Xany Officers and men fell, but the guns rctaincd their 
position, and drove back the Fmncli infantry. 
Now, the left of the line had been pushed so far forward, acting on 
the supposition that they had only the right viing of thc French Army 
to deal with, that it soon found itself under fire from French Artillcry 
Fighting etrengik, 66 offircri nnd men, 48 horses. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
34
.11
7.1
0.2
00
] a
t 0
5:3
0 1
5 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
T-IC T.\CTIC.\L PO\!X1: OI.’ X O U I X N  FIELD ARTILLERY. 315 
Bnd mitraillcurs on the left and’in rear. The lcft battery, Werncr’F, 
a few paces, wheeled outvarrls, advanced 200 paecs, and 
opc,,cd fire in reply. But in less than half an hour i t  lost two Officers, 
arec-fourths of the men, and a11 thc horses cscept eight. It had, 
lLo‘IFCvcr, silenced tho enemy’s mitrnillcurs at  a range of 900 p-&, 
.r;llen soddenly a French battalion, which l i ~ d  been conccalcd in a, near 
hollow, appcarcd elosc to tho battery, “ l i h  figurcs on a stage.)’ 
Tbcrc was 110 timc to firs even with casc. Only cight horses mere 
onu-onnilccl, yet Captain Werner ~ a v c d  two of hi? guns. Tho French 
battilion pressed on to the flank of the ncxt battery, \rhosc com- 
mander, occupied with his OWI struggle, had not perccired tho fate 
of Captain Wercer’s battery. As soon as he fclt tho fire of the 
chssep6ts, hc turnbd his guns upon thc FrencI1 battalion and dis- 
engrngcd himself, by firing- shcll a t  close quarters. Deciding on in- 
stalltancons retrcat, he snred d l  his guns  and left only one limber on 
tho field, all its tcam Imving- bccn killcd. Of coupsc sdere(1 
severely, ‘‘ unexampled Ioss,’~ Hoffbnucr calls it. 
XOVT, Gcntlcmen, here arc t-iio batteries surprised by infantry at  
close quarters. T h y  arc entirely without support. In  one CEC all 
the horses but ciglit and thrcc-fonrths of the mcn arc alrcadj- killed or 
wounded. This battery carries off two gins. The othcr battery 
suffers great losscs but carries off all its gnns.  
Then German infantry arrived 2nd the rest of the batteries wcrc 
ordcrcd to withdraF one by onc to makc good their losses. This they 
did “ with rehctnncc.” T-iio wcnt aud tho ncxt one  as attacked bJ- 
French iufantry at  400 paces. It fired case, ~Iicckcd the enemy, and 
under command of a lieutenant, f o l l o \ d  tho rest. Horses had to be 
sent for from Taggons for the next battery, and infantry fired on it 
in flank and rcar, thc German infantry--s battalion pushed formard 
after a timc to hclp the guns-7ming retired throzcgh i t  Tn-o of the 
guns sustained such losses in limbering up that they conld not move 
with the others. A lieutcnsnt remained with them and broiiglit them 
off after somc furthcr loss. Twenty-seven Artillery Officers had been 
killed or wounded in this affair, others had lost horses, one limber mas 
blown up. Rcmcmbcr, this line of guns had bcen pushed right into 
thc midst of thc chemj-. French infantry and mitraillours xcrc in 
front, on both flanks and in left rcar. It was a Balalilava Charge, 
viith artillcry instead of cavalry, yet all the guns xcrc carried off 
except four from tho left battery, which were actually among tho 
enemy, and only t-iio mcre pe;Qnnncntly rctnincd by the Brcnch. But 
for lack of horses at n critical moment, not D gun would ham been 
lost. To show the scrcrity of the French fire at  this tine, it m g  be 
sufficicnt to say, that tlic German fusilicr battdion, sent to extricate 
the left wing of tho artillery, lost in t w n t y  minutes morc tlinn Id€ 
its numbers and had to retire. 
On the other hand TYC rmd that when thc Saxon corps were 
advancing, after the storming of St. Marie nux ChBnes, two batteries 
which mcrc pnshcd forward, “sustained considerable losses from tho 
‘‘ encmy’s artillcg, and cspccially f rom sicarms of s7;i17nishers which 
‘‘ had enscaitcecl tAeniselz.es i i ;  tlic folds of f h c  grozciid towards Kw- 
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316 TIIE TACTICAL POWER OF JIOIJEltN FIELD ARTILLEBl-. 
4 1  &1+,." TITO Officers were wounded, two guns r e g  soon lost all 
their horses and nearly all their gunners. Thc batteries retired but 
came into action a littlc furthcr back. 
lifter all the Sason artillery were in position, tho enemy made 
rcpcatcd attempts to disloclgc them as me11 as other portions of the 
German artillery, which ivcrc now massed in thc neighbonrliood, but 
thc d u e  of largc masses of guns now became apparent. Whatever 
point tlic French selected to attack, their 3s-a~ to it was not only 
corered by the direct firc of tlic guns against which their assault mas 
directed, bnt also by the flanking fire of other parts of the great 
artillerj- line. Hoffbaucr sap ,  "as D rule tlic rangcs varied from 
" 1,800 to 3,200 paces, but they iwrc often mpch shorter, as for 
+ &  example, when tho cncmy's skirmishers, advancing against our 
'' front to within 800 paces, Kcrc complctcly stopped by tho German 
' &  shells." 
Speaking generally of the artillcq piislied on in the early part of 
the battle, Hoffbnuer tells us, that " the principal losses \vere caused 
"by  the cliasscpbts of skirmishers, who lay under cowr in the 
'. furron-s, as i-cll as in the ditches of the high road." 
Toivarcls tho right of the German position tlie first Army masscd 
166 guns, with the fire of vihich it completely crushed all efforts of 
the Prcnch to advance, and became so emboldened that it attempted 
to  push both infantry, cm-alry, and artillery through tlic dcfilc of 
Gravclotte, not understanding that immense masses of the enemy 
commanded by their firc both thc defile itself and the exit from it. 
Somc batteries got through with loss, but found thcmsclvcs in a 
perfect hornet's nest of Frenchmen. I cannot forbear giving yon D 
ratlicr long extract, relating tlic fortunes of one of these batteries. 
The order for it to advance was :L mistake, but, the conduct of the 
battery is worthy of immortal honour. Three Officers had been 
vounded, all the Officers' horses had bccn killed, and the battcrJ- had 
suffered cnormons losses. 
" But in spite of the losses both in men and horses, which increased 
"from moment to moment, the battery not only bmrely held its 
" ground, but also maintained its firc x-ith great effect. Shells were 
'- thrown at from 700 to 900 paccs, against hostile skirmishers in the 
liollow road, and a t  1,100 paces against ~IOSCOU, as vell as a t  shelter 
*' trenches nnd mitraillcnrs cast and west of that farm. 
'' Perceiiing the desperate situation of the battery, Lient.-Gencml 
'. Von Schx-arz sent hishdjutant tlirougli tlic storni of bullets with an 
" order for it to withdraw across tlic defile. But so many horses had 
" already bccn disabled that the battery could not bc moved, and 
" Captain Hnsse afirmccl that death \\-as prcfcmblc to Icming the 
I L  position unnecessarily. Thc firing was therefore continued, till a t  
" length but one gun could be scrrcd, and tligt by four men only; foi. 
' I  all thc gunners of tlic other detachments xverc either killed or 
'' wounded. The ammunition of its own gun-limbers, as  ell as thal 
" of a limber of tlic fourth light battery, was exhausted, and there 
was uo more a t  hand, the lines of n-aggons riot haying. bccn able to 
" pass the clcfilc." 
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TrII: T.iCTICAL POWER OF MODEEX E'IELD ,iRTII,y,ERP. 31 7 
At this momcnt the Divisional Commander arrived with thrco 
wFnggo~,icams, and rcpcatcd the order to retire. 
6' ~ c ~ l - j n g  refittcd under fire, as far as wa5 a+lutclJ- I leccssq,  tile 
6~ battcq- then retired through the defile, Its limbars riclcllcil by 
4 6  bullets, the di-irers on foot, the guns drawn bj- tuo or foul- llolv~:~, 
6: ancl closely packed wiLh the severely woundccl. Thc tl,orcmcnt \-;';dS 
1 6  mzdc a t  n xdk,  and further losses were sustained. 1rajor CocsteF 
6' (the Divisional Commander) had a horse killed under llim; the last. 
6'  gun ivas suddenly reduced to one horse, and, heavily ladcn \i-ith 
I' ,voundcd men, was obligccl to halt for assistance. Thc batterJ- 
6' J T ~ S  received a t  Gramlotto with a loud Imrrah, pnd General lrOu 
6' Sclnrarz embraccd the Commander with emotion in  thc presence of 
6 '  the troops. The retreat of this heroic battery I T ~ S  a triurnI,i;aot 
inarch in the real sense of the xord." 
Another of tho batteries which had crossed, though suffering lacaT 
losses, was partidly protcctcd by a lorn \\.all, and D;?S able to 110!,1 itq. 
ground. I ts  only supports a t  first were some w a k  detachiimlts of 
Infantry, and though further rcinforccmcnts were sent, thcy lvcre 
invariably cut to pieccs soon as they reached the dangerous point 
b~ thc tremendous fire to which they were esposed ! 
After a time the French advanced in force, driring before them 
hundreds of stragglers from different German battalions, xho 
been in or about Saint Hubert. These runm-ays rushed through the 
battery e l u s k g  men and horses togcthcr, and obscuring Ck-crJthiny 
by clouds of dust. " Captain Gniigge, utterly poircrless, saw part of 
'' his battery swept away in the general confusion; and when the 
'' turmoil was orer, threo guns without limbers, and another unhorsed 
" limber, -mrc all that remained of the battery in its original posi- 
" tion. Collecting, hoirerer, a fern gunners and infantry men, about 
" thirty in number, lic opened fire with case a t  a distance of from 310 
" to 500 paces on tlic pursuing skirmishers, and repulsctl them." 
This battery remained in its position until darkness made it impossible 
During the first attack of the Guard upon St. Prirat, thc Germans 
succcedecl in seizing a part of the hill with n detachment of the 
4th Brigade, irhich mas presently attac1;cd by strong columns fi-om 
dmnnrillcrs. The important point x i s  in danger of being lost, and 
there KLS a grcn longing for the support of artillery. L' But tho cry 
" from the hill for support had alrcadj rcachcd the 2nd Batter;. of 
" the Guard. Without n-aiting for  orders it advanced up the slope, 
" and conling into action near thc hard-pressed infantryy mainlaiued 
" the important point a,nninst n!l attacks. In  its advance thrcc gnns 
wcrc temporarily left behind, onc of them 11a1ing lost all its 
" drircrs. In this position ihc battery fired on the hostile columns. 
'' and skirmishers at  a range of 800 paces with such effect that theq- 
" were coinpelled to halt.'' But time would fail us ~ - c r o  I to attcmpt 
t o  describe all the striking incidents of the action of :irtillel-y in  this 
.wmarkabIe battle. Tl'c can only notice further t\\-o or three important 
facts. 
The artillery r a s  as usual cmplored Kith g r d  boldncss and in 
YOL: xs, S 
to lay the guns. 
L L  
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
34
.11
7.1
0.2
00
] a
t 0
5:3
0 1
5 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
:)IS TIIE TACTICAL POWER O F  JIODERB FIELD AI:TILLEl1Y. 
masses. The First Army had a t  onc time 2s battcries--16s guns 
under the snmc command, and in thc same position. The final assault 
on St. Privat was prepared by the fire of an encircling mass of 1% 
guns, to which four batteries were added a t  thc commcnccmcnt of 
the assaults, SO that thcrc wcrc at  that moment 210 guns conccn- 
trat.ing their fire on thc derotcd position. 
After the capture of St. Privnt, the artillery pushed on to hold the 
advnntagc gaincd. Thus was formcd by degrees the last grcat 
artillery mass cxtcnding from the Foret do Jaumont by St. Prirat to 
tile Bois dc la Cussc, in FLich mass, finally, 38 batteries (228 guns) 
mrc  croxrded together. The right wing of this forcc-about half thc 
battcrics-by its flanking fire, tritliout any inhntry attack, con- 
strained the 4th French corps first to change front, and then to 
rc trcn t. 
The ranges in this battle raricd bctwxn 4,000 paces (in one c& 
5,000) and 800 paces, for we max consider as csccptioual the fern 
rounds of case occasionally fired at close ranges. 
The losscs of the artillery amounted to 088 Officers and mcn killed 
and mounded, and 1,5G3 horses. 
They had fired 31,G80 ronnds, of which 20 =ere casc. 
Tlic casualties to material-bcsidcs the 2 guns taken by the Frcncli 
-were : 
2 gun carriages, 5 limbers, 2 limber boxcs, 16 \Y~CCIS,  3 breech 
picees, and 1 elcrating screw. 
Such a list appears ridiculous, but losses of matcrinl are a lwap 
trifling compared with the nnmbcr of men and horses killed and 
wonndcd. 
Sedan. 
Near tkc beginning of thc battle, the German official account 
s z -  -- 
' "ihc artillcry hat1 taken part in the engngement side by sidc with 
<' the forenlost ~e!achne?zts of infantry." 
Herc we hm-c the usual pusting on of the artillery a t  first; bnt 
listen to what comes later:- 
*' Thc arti l lcg position of the 2nd Bavarian Corps at.Fr6nois had 
" bccn reinforced by the Crown Prince's order, a t  1 o'clock, * * 8 SO 
"' that 71 German bat tcr ics426 guns in all-combined thcir fire from 
.'' thrcc diffcrtht sides upon thc French Army, vliicli TWS n o r  crowded 
-'' together inn confined space. (In the north, 14 batteries of the l l t h ,  
.'* 12 of the 5th Corps; in the cast, 15 batterics of the Guard Corps; 7 
'* Sason and2 Bavarian on thc left bank of the Gironne j 4 batteries of 
'* the 8th Division and G Bararinn batteries vest of La 3Eoncellc ; in thc 
'* south, I 1  batt-ries of the 2nd Bavarian Corps in the ground between 
'* Wadelincourt and Villetto). Xot only their batteries and foremost 
* *  lines of infantrr, bnt also their rcscrres moring bachards  and 
'' forwards, and the masses of cava1r.y x-ainly seeking corer, were 
" orcrwhclmed with such an iron hail, that they fcll more and more 
" into disorder, and found tlicir pox-cr of rcsistancc i d 1  niqh broken 
6'  before they mere evcn able to engage in the strnggle. The fate of 
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THE TACTICAL POWEC OF 3IODERN FIELD AETILLERY. 319 
46 thC battle was already, t.0 a cortaiu extent, decided by this deploy- 
l 6  ment en-masse of t h o  German artillery, Oren without tho further 
,drancc of the infantry.” 
A little later, tho official account says :- 
11 And so annilldating ~ a s  the fire of thc artillery, that tho French 
k c  were scarcely mpable of any org+zed rcsistancc, when thc German 
6‘ infantry, toirards 3 p.m., mowd forirard from all sides ag&& the 
Aanin :- 
11 But beforc these measurCS Could comc into operation, the already 
6‘ cnfecbled strength of thC enemy was utterly broken by the aunihi- 
1‘ ]sting firc of the German artillery- Tlic French Commander-in- 
6 ’  Chief, from his position at  Bahn Church, SRTF tho troops \yhich he 
11 bad brought formard gradually meIting away.” 
~n the general retrospect of the battle, the official account speaks 
 US of tho artillery work:- 
‘ I  The German artillery, the battle of Sedan, produces an espc- 
‘1 cially grand and dccisire cffect. Only thc surprise, undertiken 
6‘ during the morning-mist towards Bazeillcs, as domandcd by this 
“ sort of attack, is madc by thc infantry alonc; but at  all pmts of 
(6  thc crtcnsirc bat,&-field thc whole strength of the batteries w& 
“from the first brought into play. Inserting themsdrcs in the 
6‘ columns of rontc in s position fsrourablc to early deployment, they 
hastened forward to the baltle-field zcifh the adcanccd parties of the 
injufalitry. The batteries of tho 11th’ and 5th Army Corps, which 
‘‘ have t o  travcisc thc difficult road defilc a t  thc Bois de In Falizctte, 
deploy, trusting mainly to their orin strength, in onc long line, 
“ though opposed to the hostilc masses of horgc threatening them, and 
“ with their backs to thc Belgian frontier. As a general rule, the. 
attack of the infantry is deferrcd until the artillery lias produced its 
‘ I  fnll effect. From thc Calrairc #Illy, the cncmy is almost cselu- 
I‘ s i d y  drircn off by the fire of thc gum, whereupon a fern companies 
“ take possession of this important height without a straggle. Thc 
“shells bursting thickly in  thc Bois dq la Gnrcnnc prepare tho 
attack of the battalions of t l c  Guard, and spare the t.rcmendons 
‘ I  losses n-ith which previous victories had been purchased.” 
Pray remember, that this is not writtxt by an artillery officcr. It 
is tho voicc of Von hloltke, speaking through thc historical section of. 
the General Stafl! 
Let us now try to gather together thc main lessons to be learned 
from these battles. 
The artillery was as a rulc .pushed formard in adrancc of the inf?ntry, 
with the nhject of pining timc nnd establishing a superiority of fi.c 
early in the battle, so that tho infantry should suffer as few losses 36 
possible; and not bc delaj-cd longer than necessary befof-c attacking. 
This IT-as donc in every case, whether the enemy werc superior or  inferior 
i n  strength. 
We find thc artillery almays nblc to hdd  its gronnd when attacked 
by infantry in front in any formation, even as skir-mishers, but suffer- 
ing terribly,-and sometimes obliged to.retreat from infantry lying dorn  
r 2  
‘1 wood.’: 
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320 T ~ E  TACTICAL POWER OF MODERN .FIELD ARTILLERY. 
behind cover, or in folds of the ground. Ir. such cases them was 
always felt the want of some troops fitted to dislodge the annojing 
sbirmishers. 
Good work was done at  both rery long and rcry short ranges, from 
4,000 paces (about 3,200 yards), down to 300 or 400 paces. When- 
ever it was possible, the batteries closed to 1,000 or 1,500 yards, but 
frequently tho nature of the ground, or their position on thc flanks of 
long lines, prevented anything like near approach to,the enemy. 
The shortest ranges for offensive purposes varicd beti-ieen 1,200 
and 800 paces. 
The artillery on several ocmsions broke off from the fight in xhich 
it rras immediately engaged and made flank marches in prcscnce of 
the enemy. But hcrc x e  must remember that the Frcnch artillery 
mas decidcdlg inferior. 
Whenever it could bc done, tho batteries werc massed in long lines, 
under the fire of which nothing could continue to exist i n  formation, 
and this habit became more fixed as the Germans gnincd csperience. 
The losses were almost entirely in men and horses; the batteries 
continued in action at  the same place after extremely heavy losses, 
and, if too hard pressed, succeeded in carrying off their guns. 
Guns sometimes held their ground when infantry had to retire. 
We shall come to the reasons for this hcreaftcr. 
There are no means of ascertaining the actual losses of the enemy 
by artillery fire. If me could know them, they mould be found trilling 
compared with what they kil l  be in the next war, for the Prnssinns had 
no shrapnel, only common shells, and n6 range-finders. Their guns 
viere not so powerful as ours, or as theirs are now. 
Since thc war of 1870, artillery has made certain definite advances. 
We shall sec the effect of them tho next time two great nations take 
up arms. Bleanwhilc, for want of actual mar, we must get what light 
w e  can from the experimental practice carried out from time to time. 
Wc hare gnined some valuable facts from the practice a t  Oireiinmpton. 
Let ns csamine them for a fern moments. 
Experiments at Okeiiainplon. 
We need not spend much time orer these experiments, but we sha11 
never understand each other unless we agree, or nearly SO, as to. the 
amount of ppcticnl decisions me h a w  thc right to deduce from such 
trials, And first we must clearly separate the work on Dnrtmoor from 
that usually carried out a t  the Shoeburpcss experiments, about 
which 3-c sometimes read in the. papers. The esperimcnts I am 
speaking of a t  Shoeburpess arc unclcrtakcn to try the actual poxrer 
of ,z gun or a projectile under ccrtain definite conditions. T'liey are 
purely scientific, and as the astronomer must h?re his instruments 
marked ancl moved with the extremest accuracy, as tlie chemist inust 
wcigh his simple or compound materials to thc thousandth part of n 
grain, so must the scientific guuner spend much time and trouble in 
obtaining accurate results on which to base his calculations. 
. At Okehampton, on the contrary, every enclearour was made to 
bring the conditions as nearly as possible like those 'of war, always 
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THE TACTICAL I’OVER OF MODERN FIELD ARTILLERY. 321 
rcmemb.ring that the fire of the enemy cannot bo imitated. The 
\yere not mcasurcd by any other means than those which will, 
1 am glad to sar, soon bC in the possession of every battery. 
~h~ fire i ras sometxmes rapid, sometimes sIom and delibernte, as it 
lvoulcl be in m r .  The batteries came 
into position a t  all sorts of paces, and sometimes the targets were SO 
as to be a11 but ini-isiblc; or, what is worse, they stood out 
qpinst the sky-line in such positions that shells passing over them 
burst a t  unknown distances. The batteries were not selected nor 
specially trained for the purpose. Do not imagine -that there --as any 
desire to make the best of the occasion for magnifying the power of 
artillcry. Such an attempt viould have been as unn-orthy as it Konld 
hare been futile under the esperionced C ~ C S  of many critics. h d ,  in 
the details I am about to bring before you, trifling hits i re  not counted 
as disabling mcn. Jve will only take a fern examples to illustrate the 
power of guns a t  different ianges. TO compare them mentally with 
the ranges of the German guns in actual battle, we need only re- 
member that the length of paces to yards is about as 4 to 5, so that 
4,000 yards and 5,000 paces are nearly equal. I take the 1G-poundcE 
in all cases, ~ C C ~ U S C  tho 9-pounders of the Horse Artillery were ncn- 
guns mliich had not yet rcccired their proper tangent-scales. 
At 4,000 yards against a small cnralry column (represented by 
targets) 53 yards deep, using percussion shells in all cases :- 
G \rater-shells fired as a salro gave ........ 48 hits. 
G shrapnel .............................. 140 .. 
1 2  water-shells fired independently .......... 165 ,, 
12 shrapnel .............................. 189 ,, 
Total 36 rounds and ................ 542 ,, 
The ground n-as rcry rough. 
- 
At 3,000 yards asiinst a body of infantry, about 400 hundred men, 
supposed to be in reserve, and represented by the famous dnmmics, 
18 slmpnel xi th  time-fuzes disabled 109 men. 
So far the dummics were standing. 
At about 2,000 yards (1,950), the dummies being so placed as 
to rcprescnt n half battalion of infantry in t x o  lines, the first line 
kneeling and making every use of corer, some of the men hidden by 
rocks, the second line lying down 50 Firds behind the first :- 
36 s h p n c l  v.+h time fuzes disabled 44 out of 103 in the first line, 
and G of the second line lying down. 
At 2,000 p d s  against targets representing 288 mounted caralry 
soldiers in column of squadrons, the frontage being 36 yards and the 
Now for a crucial test. 
depth 53 :- 
I n  nine minutes 3G water-shellsgwe.. .... 3,892 hits. 
In five .. 36 sllrapnel ........ 1,574 .. 
disabling in thc first case 186, and in the second 131 men. 
Blany of tlie hits were not deadly ; but, on the other hand, many 
of the men were killed over and orer again by different shell.?,. 
Each of the squadrons was sevcrely hit, and a t  all heights from the 
ground, so thnt a column of infantry rould hare suffered equally. 
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322 THE TACTICAL POWEE OF XODERN FIELD ARTILLER~, 
I need not trouble you with tho cffcct at  the ranges generally sup- 
posed to be bcst for artillery-namely, between 2,000 and 1,000 Jar& 
-but come a t  once to short distances. 
A battery under some ccrer was supposed to be attacked by infantry 
advancing from 1,000 yards to 100. At  1,000 yards only the first line 
of 100 men in open order and supports about the same number, came 
nndcr thc firc of the battery, and Kcre allowed four minutes to advane 
400 yards. They could not haw movcd faster, for, in the four minutes, 
the range being a l ~ a y s  1,000 yards, the projectiles, shrapncl with 
time-fuzes :- 
71 mcn out of 100 xero ilisablcd in 1st linc 
24 Y, Y, 2nd ,, 
It may be said that mcn moving would hare been more difficult t , ~  
hit. But this is not thc case, because shrapnel at  short ranges cove- 
with its shower of bullets a largc depth-400 or 500 yards, so that 
to hare the true range is of very minor importancc so long as it is not 
taken too long. 
The infantry wcre then supposed to bc a t  600 yards, and in two 
lines, about 150 to 1GO in each line, always with open filcs, rank 
entire; and the artillery detachments wx-c reduced by 3 mcn each to 
reprcsent losses-a liberal reduction. Shrapnel was again fircd :- 
In two minutes 08 werc disabled in 1st line. 
Aga!n the range was shortened to -100 yards, and them was a furthep 
7, 36 Y, 2nd ,, 
reduction of 2 gunners per detachment. Shmpncl were fired:- 
'In tn-o minutes 117 mcn xere disabled in  1st line 
Y, 30 >> 2nd ,, 
The infantxy had now lost 385 men out of 400 in eight minutcs. 
having come up from scmc other force. 
another gunner having been rcmored.frcm each detachment :- 
At 200 p r d s  only one line was supposed to exist, additional men 
The battery fircd casc- 
In one minute 81 men were diiabled out of 156. 
The range IWS thcn reduced to 100 yards. Shrapnel wcre used, 
but put into thc gun reversed, so that their percussion fuzes were nest 
tho cartridge :- 
In  cne minute 113 men were disabled out of 156. 
Thus,' a t  short rangcs from 1,000 yards to 100, the infantry never 
showing more than from 200 to.300 men in open order, and latterly _ _  
much less :- 
In ten minutes firing 579 men were ki'llcd or sex-crcly wounded, 
many of them struck cver and orer again a t  the same range. 
Taking into consideration' the wliole of the cspcrimcnts I hare put 
bcforc you, is it too much to say that thc fire of an English battcry of 
tho present day (and we hopc soon to outdo all this) bcgins to bc 
effcctivc a t  about 4,000 yards, is w r y  poxerful at  2,000 pmds, and may 
be said to be annihilating to troops in any formation a t  1,000 yards 
and under. The ground must of coursc bc supposed to  be moderately 
open.. 
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~h~ question then arises, what would the infantry liarc done against 
the p u s  ? IVell, Gentlemen, we are not left entirely without know- 
I&C on this poi1:t also. Lastayear (1875) certain experiments were 
conducted in Indla, among d n c h  not the least interesting were the 
of infan@>- against guns in shelter-pits, and I will givc you the 
flBults. But Ict US bear in mind that the infantry also had no enemy 
o n  the 25th of February, 40 men of the 48th Regiment were plxed 
800 yards from tn*o gun-pits, containing imitations of guns 2nd 
dummy gunners, all posted as serving their guns, whereas in reality 
fie men would have been more tlian h3lf the tinio under cover, to say 
nothiug of the cover afforded by smoke. The infantry fired for  five 
&sult.-Threc men hit in each gun-pit. 
On the 13th of Narch, 40 picked marksmen from the 76th and 107th 
&$ments fired for f i r e  minutes at  tw-o guns in pits. The men selected 
their own positions, about 750 p r d s  from tlic guns :- 
Rcsult.-5 men hit in one pit, 0 in the other. 
On tlic 25th of Juue, 40 men of the 45th Regiment fired at  two aw~ 
Range unknown, aftcrwards ascertained to 
Result.-1 man hit in one pit, and 0 in the other. 
On the same day the csperimcnt was repeated, the 40 men being in  
The range is not given in the official report, bat 1 
firing a t  them. 
minutes :- 
in pits for five minutes. 
be 770 yards :- 
skirmishing order. 
suppose it i ~ a s  the same as before--770 p r d s  :- 
Hcsult.--S men hit in one pit, 2 in the other. 
These results givc us an arerage Ioss of 2 men per gun in five 
minutes, and sliom that the reduction of 3 men per gun m:idc in the 
Okehampton experiments to mpresent the effect8 of fire from infantry 
advancing from 1,000 yards range to 600 in four minutes, mas rather 
over than under estimated, especially as the first line would haw lo& 
thee-fourths of its strength. Remember that not mom than afew 
men a t  a time can see the gunners if they have any cover. 
Here we liare t o  face the great question of the compnmtirc physical 
and m o d  power of infantry and artiller.y, and the moral effect pro- 
duced upon one or  the other arm by equal losses. 
Before attacking this subject, p!rmit me to say that, in my humble 
opinion, the principal arm, the mainstay of an army, is, as it has h e n  
and must be lonz after our time, the Infantrj-. It is the easiest 
trained, the cheapest to place in the field and to keep there, the only arm 
which is equally powerful a t  rest or in motion, the most easily con- 
cealed, the simplest in its armament and use. Only infantry can decide 
battles and secure the ground won. Wh:itcrer may be the increasing 
d u e  of artillery, it can never snpply the place of a single infantry 
soldiei.. Bnt, 011 the other hand, tlie value of artillery has p w n  
greatly of late scars. 
If the guns are of 110 use xhen in motion, their long range renders 
the necessity for their mo-iing much less, and their mobility shortens 
the period of \reakncss. To get the full benefit of that range we n c d  
two Gdditions. The first is the range-findcr, which is at. last n d o p t d  
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.in tilc serp-jcc ; thc sccond is thc telescopic-sight, n spccitncn of d i c l 1  
has been l,lr,ught forward by Licutcnant Scott, of the Enginccrs, to 
wllom l v ~  sjiould all wish good specd in his endcarours to introiluco 
it. ~ 1 1 ~  regularity of rangc noticcd at, Okchampton iras secured by a 
rcq simple arrangcnicnt, which thcrc is no nccd to publish to all tlie 
Trorld, n n d . ~ c  112%-c rcason to beliere that the flatncss of tmjcctory, ard 
thcrcfore tlic cffcct a t  all ranges, is in n fair xay towards making 
another considerable step in advance. 
TVC may, thcreforc;take 4,000 yards as n practicable rangc for field- 
artillery. This means that n gun in action under favonrablc circum- 
stances covcrs with its fire about 7 square miles of country, and can 
change its object from one point to another inore than 4 miles distant 
from the first,, by:n siniplc movcmcnt of its trail. In other ivords, pu 
column of tlic-cncmy on thc right flank may bc hit, and within a 
minute ail-othcr column on thc left flank, niorc tlian 4 milcs distant. 
from that a t  n-hich i t  originally fircd. Such opportunitics arc, of 
coursc, csccptional. KO otlicr kind of mobility can approach this. If 
tlic guns cannot fight in motion, thcrc seems little nccd for  thcm to 
d o  so. 
.Since 300 or 400 jar& diEercncc in rangc now matters little to 
artilIcry, the guns Iisrc larger choicc of positiqns than infantry in 
ordinary cases, so .that thoy can gcncidly find fair covcr. Noreover, 
becnnsc t!it-j- nccd not. move much, thcy can make more USC of artificial 
shelter. Prom such shclter t h y  can act cithcr offcnsivcly or defcn- 
sivcly ; whcrcas infantry must morc out of its co\wr to attack, and 
ca-ra1x-j- can only attack by exposing itself completely. 
This quictndc of artillery enables it to find the range of its mark 
accurately and to fire stcadily. . Thc $ice whcrc its shclls burst mu be 
men, and thc rangc corrected accordingly if necessary. No infantry 
soldier can tell whcthcr liis bullet has gone orcr or under the enemy, or 
.struck thc mark. 
The fire of infant.ry is thc collcctirc fh of indiridual men, and de- 
pcnds for its stcadinqs on the nerse of indiriduals. Hands d l  
tremble and bullcts go astmj- after a rapid momment, ercn if the 
.soldiers are not andcr fire. When to this is addcd the ncrvous excite- 
ment canscd by the bursting of shells in front or in thc 'ranks, and thc 
sight of huge gaps made in thc linc or column, there cannot bc much 
doubt that tlic awrngc stcadincss of ncrvc, and, thercforc, thc avcragc 
firing must be wry small compared with thc stcadincss of thc same 
Thc firc of artillery is not governed by the avcragc steadiness, but 
by that.of officers and serpants, and less stcadincss is required to lay a 
gun than to liolcl n rifle straight with its sight propcrly raiscd. How 
often, think you, ~ ~ o u l r l  a man look toliis sight when advancing under 
such firc as gnns can iiow prodncc? Guns harc 110 nerrcs to be 
shalicn, and, tlic propcr orders being giren, aiming and firing is as 
much n matter of rontinc as marching. Fifty slrclls bursting in  a 
batter1 will not shake the accnracy of-a singlc gun, if oncc properly 
laid. 
I h o p  you noticed how in the battIes before Jretz the artillcv held 
THE T,~CTICAI, POWER OF XODEEX FIELD AKrILLERT. 
, men on the practicc-ground during peacc. 
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its ground somctimes when the infantry had to retire. Irou k n ~ ~  
the rule that thc loss of one-third is supposed to be about 3s much ss 
infantrx can bear without retiring. Some of the Gerlnan batteries lost 
three-fourths of their men, and ;yet held on and fonght their gu11s. 
Tl1crc was no cliffcrcncc in the men thcmsel~-es. lIr'hat, lva9 tile reason ? 
Siinply this, that the guns did, as they aln-ays will if \l-e let them, act 
Think'how much trouble is nccessar? 
before abattcry can rctirc. Somebody must take the initintire of gi&g 
the order, which must be repeated from mouth to mouth. Then the 
drivers have to perform a complicated movement, if indeed t11ey arc 
not under stress of difficulties because t h y  have horses falling 
%-Oundcd in thc midst of the teams. Nest, the gunners must attacll 
tllc gun to the limbcr-limber up, as we c ~ U  it. Only is the 
battery as me11 able to retire as infantry alwq-s is. The gnu is, there- 
foi-c, a moral anchor to the gunners. 
But it is more than this. Each gun is the rival of its companions ill 
the battery. Tlicj- have, ill 
good-natured iiralry, struggled to makc it  first in beauty of polish an(( 
paint for itself and its carriage. They liavc striven to hide its defects 
nut1 glorify its virtues. Gentlemen, t h y  1ia.r-e callcd it she-nceci I SXJ- 
more ? 
Well, then, this " she " is not easily deserted, and as a gunner has no 
ot1:er arms, he fights his gun to the last moment. Without her, he is 
disarmed and helpless ; with her, no matter how rnanr of his coni- 
rades are disabled, the power of fir0 is almost as ,mat as ever. And 
she remains there as stc?dy.as a rock, n11vay-s throwing defiance in the 
enemy's face. Surely it is not difficult to scc ~ v h y  n battery should 
hold its ground, if m e  will only let it, if me don't teach tlic gunners to 
count the prescrdion of their guns as an cnd instead of D means. 
Bnt the guns possess a qnaIity which Kature has ~nerciful l~ denied 
to female. creatures gcncrallj--that of increasing their individual 
strength by combination. The effect of tho guns is grcatly increased 
by their employment in masses. 
Take, for instance, the cavalry espcrimcnt at Ozchampton, the 
model of d i c h  is before you. The cffcct was produced by 3G rounds 
of water-shell in nine minutes. Bieauwhilc,' after the first six shells 
the troopers might haw dispersed or galloped under corer. Had sis  
batteries been thcrc, tho same or greater physical effect would hare 
been produced in an instant of time, and the moral cffcct would hare 
been overwvhclming. 
A battery of 100 guns would, roughly spcakiiig, occupy about a 
mile, and in former days a mile was a long range for guns. But now 
a line two miles long rnighh fire ensilyat the same object, and tho guns 
a t  one end could protect those a t  the other by flnnking fire. There- 
fore every increase of range lends n new argument to the advocatm of 
massing tactics. 
But I cannot find, either in reason or espcriencc, any proof of a 
proposition which has lately been brought forward by an able writer 
on defensive tactics-namclr, that the guns should be placed some 400 
yarcIs behind the infantry. If all the experience of the last xar Rill 
anchors t3 thc gunners. 
I n  peace its gunners hare clierished it. 
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not suffice to dispel the idea, neither d l  Xapolcon’s m a s h ,  which, 
howercr, may come to our aid. He l a p  do- the rule that artillcry 
can defend its own front in these words :- 
“h’o infantry, however brave, can with impunitj- march 1,000 or 
1‘ 1,200 yards against a strong battery of artillcry wcll placed and 
‘‘ mll scrrcd ; before they could accomplish tvo-thirds the distance, 
‘‘ these men would be liilled, wounded, or dispersed.” 
“ ~ l r t i l l c r ~  should always be placed in the most admntagcous p s i -  
“ tions, and as far in front of the line of cavalry and infantry as & 
“ possible without compromising the safety of the guns.” 
A11 my pains \ d l  hare been in rain i f  the impression rcmains in 
jour minds that artillery is a thing to be protected and kept out of 
reach of harm. If you treat it so, it will be nothing but an incum- 
brance to you. Like thc queen at  chcss, it is either 3, source of grcat 
strength or weakness, according to the way we use it. 
Let us now try to gather our floating ideas into a fern definite prin- 
ciples. h for details, they must vary according to circumstances. 
And again :- 
1st Principlc. 
Since field artillery can move a t  a trot, and its fire is of great d u e  
at all stages of a battle and at all ranges, a general should endcaTour 
to obtain To gain this, 
his whole or nearly his whole force of guns should be pushed well 
forward and massed at  the beginning of a combat, so that it may 
crush the cncmy’s artillery in detail as the latter comes into position. 
%id Priiickle. 
Whether acting offensivcly or defensively, artillery can protect its 
oum front in ordinary open country, and should not retire bcforo 
infantry unless the whole force is retreating. 
3rd Principle. 
But artillery can be sorely annoyed, o r  even caused to retirc, by the 
fire of infantry skirmishers, well concealed in folds of ground or be- 
hind walls and trees. Therefore infantry should not attack in any 
formation, but, so to say, stalk the guns. dnd,  this bcing gmnted, 
infantry should nlicays attack gnns j who knows but that thej- may be 
unsupported ? 
4th Priiiciple. 
The only rep11 to such hidden attacks, carly in the battle bcforo the 
friendly infantry has .come up, is by the use of dismounted cavalry; 
or, better still, by mounted men trained to work on foot either as rifle- 
men or gunners, ,and permanently attached to the batteries. 
5t7~ Principle.. 
Since artillcry can take care of itself, provided iks flanks are pro- 
tected, a linc of guns may be deployed, and behind it the infantry may 
effect turning movements to act on the enemy’s flank. When such a 
flank attack is ready to be delivered, the mass of gnns should conccn- 
superiority of artillery as early as possible. 
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tr& their fire on that part of the enemy's line about to bc assailed, 
G t h  PrincQde. 
till it is shaken. 
3 sj-stem of signals should devised and used, so ns to enable a 
large numbcr of gum to act si.multancouslj- against thc same point. 
7th Principle. 
W k n  thc idant ry  combat has comeneed, as many guns as pos- 
siblo should be pushed close UP to the enemy, say within 1,000 ynrds, 
or to that distance A c r e  they 1131 find the best and nearest positions 
8th Priizciple. 
When artillciy advances to close combat, a considerable number of 
men and horses should follow the batteries as near as they can con- 
sistently with keeping under coFer. If this be done, there is no fear 
of leaving the guns in the hands of the enemy. At such moments, 
cover becomes a secondary consideration. Artillcry, libre inEantry or 
cavalry, in-close combat must count on h e a v  losses inmen and horses, 
but they must determine to crush the enemy in that part of the field, 
Emcmbering that " omelettes arc not made without breaking of eggs." 
9th Prim@le. 
Sinec n frontal attack can be beaten off a t  any range, artilleg, if it 
has a clear spaco of 1,000 yards in front of it and scouts on Uanks, 
should not allow itself to be turned from its immediate purpose by the 
reported approach of large bodies of infantry. Such attacks maj- be 
neglected till the enemy comes within 1,000 yards. 
to the enemy. 
10th PrizcQiZc. 
Range-findcrs, tclcscopcs, and scouts arc indispensable to the develop- 
ment of the full p o m r  of artillery; the same may be said of spare 
men, horses, and ammunition. The front line of the battery should 
hare ns few men and horses as possible, and should bo fed from the 
rear, two or three times over if neeessaq-. 
But the p e a t  principle of all, and that which must undcrlic all 
minor ones, is that artillery has issued from its childhood and is as 
xell ablc to shift for itself as any other arm. This docs not mean that 
it is independent of the others, but that it is only dependent on them 
in thc same scnse that they arc depcndcnt on it. C a m l g  should feel 
the way, and be ready afterwards to support the guns n+h the dashing 
self-devotion characteristic of its nature and historj-. The infantry 
should never forget that the guns in front may be sorcly in need of the 
arm Fhich can do emrything but more quickly. drtillcry is, after all, 
onlyprcparing the way for the glorious strife of thc foot-soldiers. The 
gunners arc dying that the infantry maplire and  in the day. On the 
field of battle we are all brothers, and our only rkalry should be to try 
which can, a t  any sacrifice, do most for. the common good. 
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~ ] ~ c  CjraInxis : Gcntlcmcn, I think n discuseion upon this rery intcrcsting 
subject would be of grcat use to thc Army-, who d l  read this lccturc in various 
parts of tho world. IVc Iiarc now heard the subject dcalt with from an artillcry 
p i n t  of riew, and I have no doubt tlicrc arc somc infantry or caralry officers present 
~ 1 1 0  i~ould  like to discuss Colonel Brackenbury’s papcr. I would cspccially call 
attcntion to thc fact, that in the illustration Colonel Brackenbury ha3 nscd with 
rcspcct to firing at battcrics, the guns wcrc in  gun-pit3 and i t  wonld not be n l m p  
posiblc in action for artillery to construct tliesc pits. I think it would be rcry 
ndrantagcous if somc caralry or infantry officer prcrent would be good enough to 
gire u3 their opinions on tlic subjcct. 
I nm not prcpared to join issue 
in any manner with what Colonel Brackenbury has so ably told us, and I hare 
grcnt diliidencc in offcring any opinion. It seems to me, lion-crer, therc is onc 
little point Coloncl Brackenbury lias omitted to state with regard to’ the cspcri- 
nicnts nt Okclianipton, namely, how the guns m r c  attackcd by the dummy half 
bnttdion. Did the guiis adrnnce, or 1ra3 tho half battalion adranccd? I am 
iuclined to think the battery adranccd. IIc t d d  us that thc front of the 
dummies rcprcscnting monntcd caralry in colnmn of squadrons vias 36 prds,  
but wlnt was tlic front of tlie half battalion of iufantrj-? I do not think lie 
stated that, bccaurc it makcs a considerable ditrercncc if you box up D battalion of 
inf;nitry into a compact formation. For it i3 cridcnt, I think, that the losses 
nliicli thc infantry would cspcriencc undcr a more lateral formation would bc con- 
sidcmbly lezs. Although it is possible to morc the guns, I doubt if you could the 
dunimiw, and I am iuclincd to think, if the battcrics adranced and the dummies 
werc halted, that a cGnsidcrub1c diffcrcncc ~ o u l d  bc the rcsult. Aftcr listening to 
Colonel Bmckenburj, I must E ~ F  that I fccl that I am rathcr sorry I am an infantry 
soldier, bccausc I do not know d a t  our rGZe is to  bc in the futurc. IIc did, lioricrer, 
lcnrc us o m  small loop-hole, for lie said that although thc front of tlie artillery is 
safe, the flank is nat equally safc, and tlie on11 rord of comfort is, that hc admits in 
the battles he describes, therc was sometimes a biting fire from infantry concealed 
in  furrows and bcllind trees, EO tlint, to use his o m  argumcnt, I think there is still 
a futurc left for tho infantry soldier. I think ererything hc laid d o m  was dcnc 
in a most fair m y ,  and the result will be, I hope, that it will make us infantry 
officers a little morc anxious to ECC what T\-C can do to dcrclop the ucfulncss of our 
branch of the scrricc. It is quitc truc that, as he erpresscd it, tlic guns arc a 
“moral” anchor to the gunners; but I go further and would add they arc n 
‘‘ physical ” anchor simply because thcy cannot run a\m$, as it  seems thc horscs 
nrc a l ~ a y s  hot. Spcaking as a so-callcd “mounted officer,” I supposc 1 may say 
our horscs are likely to be shot also, and therefore r e  shallnot be ablc to run n n y .  
I think on tlic whole, tlicn, we arc not in such s bad ray as might be snpposcd, and 
that the futurc, far ns, aborc all otlicrs, lics in Colonel Brackenbury’s remark that 
“ Infantry e1iouId a1~mj-s attack guns.”’ 
I have not the adrantago of being either an infantry or 
a caralry officcr, ncitlicr haw I the adrantagc of tlic genernl prncticc in field 
artiIIerJ- which has bcen dcrcloped so clcarly by Colonel Bruclicnbury on this 
occasion, but i t  ecems to me tlicrc is onc point which might bc considered. I 
observe as rcgards tlic expcrimcnts at  Okchampton against carahy and infantry, 
thc frontal attack which t l c  Colonel has dcrclopcd is thc only attack supposcd. I 
do not rcincmbcr that lie speaks to any extcnt of tho infantry flank attack, except to  
disregard it ; nor is a q  mention madc of n combination which I cnnnot but tllink 
may be cfcctirely formed ofliglit caralry and horsc artillery. Refercncc has bccn 
made by Coloiicl Brackenbury to the use of cumlry on one occasioii, d i e r e  hc 
Speaks of tllc Gcnnans rcmuining quiet undcr the obscrration of ma59e3 of the 
JIajor J. XORTII CREALOCK, 95th Rcgimcnt : 
Coloncl Lord WAVESET : 
It may bc questioned, pcrhaps, if thc lccturcr could have drawn the snmc eon- 
cluaion, Tiz., adrising boldncs3 in pushing on artillery, had thc Ercncli nttacked in 
place of rcmnining on the dcfcnsire-when fhey did attack-the German artillery 
would appcar to have bccn grcatly compromiacd and had the fortune of a day’s 
fight becn in the farour of t h  Frcneh, it is diacult to see how the Germnn guns 
could hare crcr bccn ritlidmm.-J. N. C. 
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horse. Thesc troops werc almost in h c ,  and their morcment could only bo 
of 3 frontal attack. I remcinber snmc year3 Eincc readin” a rcry &rer work, 
%dtten, I think, by C+eneral Smith, of n e r  Majesty’s light w>a15, ant1 editcd, as 
I learn,. by !n officer of the R o J ~ ~  +t+ry, Lieutennnt-ColoncI I k n r y  
Brackenbury, 111 dmh hc lays d o n  as thc principle of his operjtione thc combins- 
tioll of the adrnnec of horse artillery with light crralry. The matter was reduced 
to ln~thematiml proportion, as indeed dl ttieec details shoidd be, and it ~ r a s  there 
how in  sueecssirc morements of artillery and caralry, important ground 
might be won andmainhined. 1 cannot but think it nould be perfectly posjiblo 
to &relop Colonel Braekenbury’s principle as to  thc use of dismountc~l cara1r-j by  
an gpplicntion of mounted wralry also. I supp~sc tho application of a corps of 
carnlry trained something after thc Cossack fashion. The peculiarity of tho 
cn:osfinek attack is this : that although thc soldiers are disciplined and tnincd to act 
togcthcr, they work in “ schwarm i ” that is to say, in clumps of horsemen, with 
wllomit is exceedingly difficult to deal in detail. Thcy adranee in and 
=treat in masses j and if this bc borne in mind that it nould be perfectly possible 
G t h  light guns to makc a flank attack on guns 011 a linc o f a  mile 103g to  enrelope 
them by swarms of thc-ic light horsemen, and that it would bc exceedingly dilficult 
dispcrsc these horsemen, who would furnish the means of accumulating a11 orcr- 
,&&ning force of firc on the h n k  of this long line, it \rill bc seen that if tile guns 
aerc shaken in this way it mould possibly effect a rery serious loss on the flanks of 
tile linc of artillev. I may ask how long it would take to wheel up to a flank so 
Ba to resist a flank attack on EO long a line? There is another point which struck 
mc particularly in Colonel Braekenburfa remarks on thc concentration of guns. 
pays, in the h s t  great attack in thc battle of Ctrarclotte after the capture of 
St. Prirat, an artillery line was formed estcnding from tho Fortt dc Jau~ lo~ l t ,  to
tho Bok dc 1% cusse, in which 228 gun3 were cromded together. Xov, I submit 
this to hisis.considewtion :whether, assuming thc existcnec of a school of ofiiccrs 
who were twined to t l h  massing of guns and light caralry, not light wralry of tho 
regulstion class, but light c a r a l r ~  trained to  act in thc Cossack fashion--\Fhetller 
guns accumuhted in such masses would not bc deprived of their usefulness by tho 
rery accumulation to which they are indebted for their grcat strength in resisting a 
frontal attack. This is a point which has occurred to me. I deriwd my icice from 
tho mork that I lnrc referred to, and it has seemed to mc that very possibly sue11 3 
combination as mu euggested in that work which I ienture to introduce to your 
notice, might increase tlic req- great power that ha3 been so satisfactorily shown to  
bc dereloped in  our modern field artillery by Colonel Brackenbuq, by enabling a. 
power of attack in morcmcnt and resistanec combined to be dcreloped, of which, a t  
present, ne l i n ~  not secn any examples. 
Colonel BRACKESBURT : I do not find much to reply to, as I am not aware that 
any strong criticism has been made upon what I hare had the pleasure of briuging 
before you. Therc is, honcrer, onc point on which I am afraid I may hare been R 
little nihunclerstood, although I tried to guard myself against misunderstanding. I 
by no means say that the power of infantry is any less than it has been. F o r  do I wish, 
n3 I think I remarked, that one single infantry man should be taken nir3y. I n i a r r l ~  
claim for guns thzt their poaer has been derelopccl of late ycars, and tlint theg can 
do certain things which they could not formerly do. But I ~hould bc the last man 
in the rrorld to attempt to decry that Eplcndid in th t ry  which lins orcr and over 
again in  the fields -hero Enghnd has been victorious carried off most gloriously thc 
honours of the d37. I deprecate any attack on the d u e  of infantrr, or attempt t o  
dcpreciatc it in any way whaterer. 
With regard to the practical questions which hare been asked, I would reply to  
JIajor Crcaloek that thc fornlations of infantry at  Okehampton werc in orerx casc 
taken as exactly as possible from the model which has brcn laid d o m  for the future 
of thc British Army, and is nolr carried out gcncnlly a t  Aldershot. The front of 
the half-battalion can, therefore, bc casily direorered by refcrring to the book i but 
hcmust not forget that specid oemsion when thc infantry was formed air11 front 
r a ~ ~ k  kneeling and behind corer, and rear rank lying d o m .  Jlajor Crcnloek also 
remarks that his horse, as astaffoffecr, and thooc of artillery offirers, a r e r r v  likely to 
sufier considerably. Certainly tkc horses do get killed, but the guns do not, awl 
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therefore a grcat part of my argument r e n t  to show how therc must bc a front line 
of guns, n t h  just EO many men as arc ncccssary to<ork.thcm, and as few 
horses 35 possible, with a rcscrrc behind of iucn and horscs, kept nndcr corcr, but 
alwap rendy !o supply 10ssc3 in the battery, and to urrF of€ the guns, if Iiccessav. 
dS for corcr, it  was one of the arguments of my Lecturc tlmt artillcry haro geuc ra l~~  
greater choicc of corcrcd pogitions than any other arm. Lord Warcncy’s suggestion 
of employing the wralry like Cossncks seclps to bc an excellent one. . I do not insist 
6n the particular naturc of thc troops which EhOUld be employfd, whether thq 
Ehould bc caraIr~- or monntcd infantrr, or artillerpen, who can work both z9 
caralry,mountcd infantry, and gunners, though I should prefer thc lntttr. But they 
must be able to accompany the battcrics at  any pace, and to keep d o m  tlic fire of 
E U C ~  infantry as may bc lying in the furrows and dcprcssions of tlie ground, annoy 
ing thc artillery. and crcn Eomcthcs obliging it fo rctirc when no frontal attack of 
infantry in formation could do EO. 
Lord W a n x q  also spoke of thc weakncsa of tlic flank3 of artillcrf. Undoubtedly 
they arc n-eak, but I h ~ r c  yet to learn that tlie flanks of any arm arc strong. Flank8 
alwa-is must bc vcak, and whether wc Iiarc a linc of guns or a linc of infantv, both 
ilanl& must in some way or other bc protcctcd, or n t  lcast guardcd, from uucxpcctcd 
attack, by haring troops pushed out to pirc warning of tlic approach of thc enemy. 
I do not think thcrc is any rery great differcncc bctwcen the flank3 of an artillerr 
linc and thosc of any other linc. With regard to massing guns, I think that. a mi- 
take is occasionally made in asking OlTIccrs wlicther thoy advocatc thc massing of guns, 
or the scpamtion of guns and conccutntion of their fire. It comes to this, thatgou 
cannot liclp massing thc guns ; if sou only push p n r  batteries fornard, they trill 
natunlly find for thcmoelrcs places ou the surface of thc country where they can 
act best, and thcy will therefore comc togcthcr by a eort of nntural law. 
Thc CIIamMAx : Tho suLjcct which has bcen PO ably dealt with this afternoon in EU& 
a rcry intcrcsting And mrcful manncr by Coloncl Bnckcnbury is onc that I am sure 
you d l  all a p e  m t h  m e  in thinking of the dcepcst intercst to EtUdCUts of inilitav 
history, and treats of a most important subject for tlic consideration of ercry soldier 
and Officer who aspires to.any command ia war. Until recently it has been em- 
t omav  in our Eerricc to learc tlic diicussion and consideration of artillcry subjects 
almost ezclusirely to artillcry Officcrs ; the grcat bulk of our Officcrs contenting 
t1:emsclves mith tbc study of thc drill, organization, and tactical rcquirements of 
their o m  bnnch of t.lic Eerrice. In  fact, until thc reccnt grcat wnrs drew attcntion 
gcnemllg to this subject, wc were eontcnted, as an army and as a pcoplc, to consider that 
tbc question of prtillcry tart.ics lind bccn ctfectirely disposed of by the regulations 
in onr drill-books, which laid d o n  that battcrics were to conform in nction to thc 
moreinents of thc infantv or cavalry to which the7 wcrc attached. You dl find 
in the accounts of some of thc most remdiablc bat tlcs fought by the grcat cs t commander 
in thc world somccatraordinaq exnmplesofagrcat conccutmtionof guns. Bat,curious 
to say, from thew examples ne, as an army, learned but rcry littlc, although they may 
hare bcen of usc to a fcw military students, who m a j  liarc dcduccd from thcin wry 
useful concluoions for their o m  futurc guidance ; but as an army ire were contented 
with tlic rule in tlic drill-books to which I 1iarc referred. Whcn an army was to bc 
organised for nctirc scrricc in any part of the world, our Generals seemed to content 
themselres mtli  attaching to each brigade and each division of the army.% certain 
number of field battcrics, which wlicn used m r c  brought into action, according to 
our rcguldionp, with the mnzzlcs of their guns benutifully dresscd in  a linc upon tho 
adjoining infantry or caralry. This h q l  no doubt a mry striking nnd thestricd 
effcct in sham fights, and was look-cd cpon by a great numbcr of old sergeant-majors 
with tlic grcatcrt possible delight, but it was an ignorant use of artillcry ; in fact, i t  
was not only a ridiculous and ludicrous display, but itwas positively injurious to tho 
intcrcsts of thc .Army, because i t  conrcycd to tlic minds of young ~oldicrs and 
Oflicers, ~ I O  rroulrl look at thcsc &am fights a3 a means of learning whxt real imr 
was, the idea tliat if tlicy wcnt into nction in comninnd of artillcry, tlic proper dis- 
position of it nas to  liarc the batterics in line nith thc ncighbouring cavalry and 
infantry. r c q  carlg in our 
m?nacurrcs, wlim II.R.11. tlic Commauder-in-Chief directcd tlic gcncrnl opcintions, 
hc saw horv inapplicnblc such an arnngcmcnt was to r c d  war, and I am glad to ~ 3 y  
I am glad to. E ~ Y  that this lias lion- bccu clinngcd. 
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cn,am&patcd the artillery from that ludicrous obligation to nllicli they had been 
But although XTC all fccl that it is as neccsanry a3 crcr it 
t h c c  arms of thc serricc should co~nbinc togcther in  
~ t j o l l ,  iti3 still ileccmrr to  girt to both thc c a d r y  commander and the infantry com- 
,anclcr s great deal of latitude ofmorcmcnt, if you wish to obtain from both these a m 3  
of scrricc all that t%-.am capable of affording you. Tlicrc is onc point to which I vould pspeci?Ily direct p a r  nttcntion, and that is a point I originaUJ- intended to 
qfk To,l to think of when 1 row, and it is o point of far greater importance. It is iilis : t!d bcforc 3 1 1 1  Ofieer can r c d y  be fit to command troops in action, it is fibso- 
lutclF neeessay t h t  he sh0~1d ~ T C  thought out for himself this artiilcn question 
a3 t1loroughly a3 any artillery Oficer can h a ~ c  done so. Until hc ]las hone FO, 1 
beljerc it will bc impossible fqr him cilieiently, or with duc regard to tllc interests of 
countrr, to command Her Uajestr's troops in action. ds 1 hare nlrcady paid, 
arc, 8 s  an army, too much inclined to dcrote our attention to thc special bnncll of 
rcrriec in which XTC IIWC been brought up. Tkc cducarion aud tnining gircn t o  
Oniccrs is cmincntly calculated to direct their attention to tllc solution of 
tilL problem ; but there cannot be any greater error tlian to imagine tllat spccjnl 
trAining is ncccssary in order to solve it. I fed conrinccd that, as regards thc tactical 
*c and rnorements of artillery in action, there is 110 mystery vhatcrer, and that 'c)lc 
I <  BIIO runs may read." Any man who d l  b r i q  a mind of ordinary ability to study 
the subject enn mastcr it, by carefully studping the historJ- of recent wars, and by 
bringing his mind to bear upon the subjcct. I f c  n i U  find it to bc one a3 COSY of 
eolntion a3 any of thc other problcms in  mar. I think thc information which hm 
been gircn us upon thk Enbject by Colonel Brackenbury is rcry important. T]lanks 
to the rules of this Institution, thc lectures dehercd herc arc published, EO as to be 
mnd in crcry garrison where British troops arc quarkred nll  orer the world. I 
therefore fccl justified, not only on the part of those I ECC herc, but of all military 
studcuts in rcmotc parts of Her Najestfs dominions, in conrcyiug to ColoneI 
Bmckcnbury our rery best and sincere thanb  for thc interesting and delightful 
Lecture he has gircn us. 
clo,m in former days. 
been in past ti& that 
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